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Ramon de Miguel 
May 3rd marks the end of the new Commission's first 100 days. Jacques Santer described 
its ambitions. in his speech to the EP from which we can draw 3 central messages: 
1) That the EC should be closer to the people 
2) That it therefore should keep to the motto of "Less, but better" 
3) That it should work more closely with other institutions 
In pursuit of the first we must therefore ensure that we put out clear and simple 
messages. Even if they deal with technical matters they must be explicable. The Bruxelles 
press corps is extremely knowledgeable because they have been here for such a long 
time; because of this we do occasionally have a tendency to talk jargon. Subsequent 
articles are thus not always intelligible to many readers. Another related problem is that 
there is often too much emphasis on the written press; we must make every effort to use 
multimedia possibilities . . 
In pursuit of the second we must concentrate on those things we do best. Subsidiarity 
should be applied to information policy. This does not mean necessarily that the 
Commission should do Jess but rather that the member states should do more. · And it 
works both ways - added value may best be achieved at an EU, not national level. It is 
worth noting that the Edinburgh Council drew up a list of 100 directives that should be 
withdrawn in the interests of Subsidiarity . Of these only 3 were initiated by the 
Commission; the rest had been suggested by the Council. Subsidiarity also means that 
there should not be one single message as the markets for information are different. At 
the very lea~ we should be able to vary our presentation across different audiences. 
In pursuit of the third we must ensure greater co-operation with the EP. The Commission 
and Parliament have frequently ignored each other. At present their respective offices are 
· not in the same location and their messages are often different. We also need more co-
operation with the Member States. 
It is not a coincidence that Mr Oreja's portfolio contains both DG X and the IGC. One 
of the most serious mistakes of Maastricht was its being behind closed doors. Every 
Member State should hold a Referendum, and will be under pressure from electorates to 
do so. Governments will have a big information role to play: 
nhe IGC sliould be the Member States' main EU Info commitment for 1996. It will last 
longer than we think, perhaps a few years. We need to win the fight on the streets. 
Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Bruxelles/Wetstraat200, B-1049 Brussel- Belgium - Office: . 
Telephone:direct line (+32-2)29 .......... , exchange 299.11 .11 . Fax: 29 ...... .... . 
... _, __ . ,..,.., .. c:,, ci ..,1 P.77 T<>IPnr,.ohicaddress: COMEUR Brussels. 
\ . 
IGC (David Martin and Jean-Louis Bourlanges) 
David Martin : 
1) The ne.ed for the EU to deliver effectively on existing and future policies. 
2) The need to be more appealing and closer to citizens (Subsidiarity) 
3) The need to cope with enlargement (decision-making is close to breakdown). 
To provide these it stresses, 
(1) A simpler and more inspiring treaty. The average citizen should be able to read it and 
understand the aims of the EU and how it works. Ireland produced 10 pages on 
Maastricht and got a "Yes\ the Danes did the opposite. 
DM would like to consolidate and get rid of o~tdated articles. (E.G. That the CAP should 
increase agricultural production. 
It will be difficult to get a single institutional structure in 1996, because it would mean 
getting rid of the structure of 3 pillars, which it would be premature to try and remove. 
Pillar III takes one of the 4 freedoms (movement of people) out of the Commission 
structure and could thus be a breach of the treaty of Rome. 
(2) Concerning "becoming more appealing to the Citizen" : The chapter on Economic and 
SociaJ Rights , and Working Rights, is extremely relevant here: So are new rights relating 
to racism, xenophobia, & huml:l.n rights & the s.ocial dimension. Properly handled, this 
could provide a clear statement that the EU speaks for people. We need also more 
· openness in decision-making. All documents should be made available unless there is a 
political decision otherwise. The Council should meet in public when passing legislation 
(not when acting as executive). 
(3) Coi:iceming Subsidiarity, there are too many overlapping competences. 
(4) In order to "deliver", we will require more efficient decision-making and more 
accountable institutions; intsead of 25 decision-making procedures there could be 3. 
Other recommendations are: 
- Co-decision and majority voting should be the norm. 
- Assent (e.~for multinational). 
- Consultation only for foreign policy and non-legislative areas. 
- On Majority voting versus unanimity, there are arguments for using QM for changes 
in the treaty, eg re own resources and tax matters. 
We hope also to change institutions for Enlargement. 
71 % of votes .could be still a minority of the population . Double· majority mi ght then be 
recommended. A QM and population cohesion combination is complicated . It would be 
better to give 4 Member States 15 votes. · 
- The quid pro quo for smaller member states would be _the guarantee of 1 Commissioner 
4"'er Member State while getting rid of 2 Commissioners for some states. 
·- Concerning the 2 courts, we must go below 1 judge per Member State. We could not 
have 24 or 30 judges. . 
- Similarily the EP is close to breaking point and +700 MPs would be unworkabl e 
/ 
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Policy Framework for the 21st Century: 
We must consider · 
- How and when to get rid of Pillars 
- Reform of the CAP (whose goal is to increase production) 
- The distinction between obligatory and non ... obligatory spending 
- On EMU we must not reopen criteria on timetable but could add goals for employment, 
cohesion, etc. 
These ideas would move the EU closer to federalism, especially by giving the 
Commission a greater role in all pillars. 
Jean-Louis Bourlanges 
Federalism means different things in different member states. In France it means a United 
States of Europe. 'It is a more respectable word 'in Germany. 
' 
We favour disproportional weight to small member states but the question . is how 
disproportionate. Luxembourg has 2 votes so Malta and Cyprus should -get at least 2. 
Some smaller Member States like Ireland are not against 15 votes for the larger countries. 
- On EMU, there should be no new criteria but there is a need for a parallel economiq 
policy to go alongside monetary union. 
,;. A lot of dead articles, and technical working groups should be set up as part of the 
IGC to look at these. e.g: EP has to make annual report to Council of Europe assembly 
(ECSC Treaty). 
- Need to have the final legal text of the new treaty available when national parliaments' 
debates start. 
J-LB 
I am against extra votes. I prefer conditional simple majority voting, and not double 
majority . 
With Pecos we will have 6 large and 14 small states - this would lead to a situation in 
which the small states could block a majority . 
Double majority might be too complicated and 15 votes easier and neater. 
-Problems to be faced are that: 
- There is too much technocracy 
- The regionalisation of security in Europe will result in the gradual withdrawal of the 
US. 
- QM in the PESC will be difficult in the short term. So some member states could act 
and others not, but there should be no blocking by those who don't want to participate. 
- PESC presidency has no real power. The Big 3 ignored it in Yugoslavia. 
- The Co_mmission should have initiative powers and the Council decision-making 
powers. But it will be difficult to persuade Member States to revers~ Maastricht. 
,. The Commission should be politcially responsible before the Council as well as the 
·Parliament. Delors was ready to accept this. 
- There is a need to cope with the greater diversity of the EU which enlargement will 
exacerbate. 
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- ~xtra members must mean end of unanimity. It is ii;onic that an inter-governmental 
Europe has become more a la mode when it should be the opposite. It is the dying kick 
of nationalism. · 
- I favour a massive reduction of the number of Commissioners 
· - We must acccept that there is no such thing as European public opinion but there is 
~ational public opinion on the EU. There is only derived EU citizenship, and not direct. 
,, 
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President Hensch 
The EP now has more real power. 
- Mr Santer would not be President of the Commission without EP vote. Ditto the 
Commission as a whole. The hearings have given more legitimacy to the Commission, 
· which is now more dependent on the EP. 
- The EP also has more power over legislation; some legislation has to have EP approval. 
For example, the EP rejected the genetics patent directive and the Turkey Customs Union . 
- It is misleading to say that the EP has no power over the Commission because it can 
only dismiss it as a whole and not individual Commissioners. National Parliaments don't 
have this power either, (except theoretically). 
- EP should have co-decision in all cases of Q.M. This is a central EP demand for the 
IGC. 
- It is better to use our present powers correctly than to press always for new ones. Also 
we must make our use of them more transparent and democratic. The general public has 
trouble knowing which of the institutions decides what. 
- There is more public interest in the JGC than Maastricht, where people only woke up 
1 week before to what was going on - due to the closed nature of the debate. The bulk 
of th'e information work must be done in the individual states and the more local the 
better - not just governments but also political parties. 
- The notion of national parliaments composing an EU senate is daft. Jhe same is true 
for any additional institution, which would only confuse people more. What we need is 
a better balance between existing institutions and more efficiency 
- There is more likely to be a different shareout of power between different EU 
institutions rather than more transfer .of sovereignty to us. If we can persuade people of 
this they might take more interest in and/or be less hostile to the IGC. 
- The Conference of Presidents of the EP and the 15 national parliaments which is held 
annually takes place in London on May 15th. They will discuss information among other 
forms of cooperation. A sub-group COSAC meets every 6 months. Now concentrating 
on IGC. There also will be ad hoe meetings. Brok and Guigou (members of IGC Groupe 
de Reflexion) will . be in close touch with National Parliaments. 
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Michel Petite 
There are more questions than answers at this early stage. 
The overall agenda is composed of three phases. 
- From now until June 2 Reports will be prepared and published on the functionong of 
Maastricht by the three institutions. We have had only one and a half years of experience 
of Maastricht. 
- From June 2 to end 1995:. Messina will establish a reflection group which will produce 
a Report for the Madrid Summit on what ·the IGC should agree. Could also produce 
options if there is agreement. 
- Jan 1 96 beginning of IGC under the Italian Presidency 
(1) Concerning these Reports - That of the Council is very factual but if one reads 
between the lines one can find some criticism of Maastricht, although Council doesn't 
want to commit itself to radical change. The Commission will be between the Council 
ane EP approaches. It sees three shortcomings: 
(a) Maastricht was overcomplicated with +/- 20 different legislative procedures (co-
decision, Cooperation, QM .etc). These should be reduced to 3 or 4 eg one for foreign 
affairs, one for internal , one for budget, and one for changes in the Treaty. 
It must be clear who is responsible for decisions - people tend to blame Brussels. 
(b) The PESC in particular is very complicated. Also it has not worked well. With better 
procedures something might have been done in Yugoslavia. The procedures are certainly 
faulty '- however the real problem is the lack of political will. There has been no central 
analysis faculty . France, the UK and so on have their own and come to the table with 
their own national analysis. A central cell could both do analysis and provide options. 
The PESC suffers from a "deficit of personality". Who, for instance, does Clinton phone. 
He used to phone Delors who had to say he had no power. So Clinton has to scrap his 
telephone numbers every 6 months. One suggestion is to have one PESC specialist 
minister appointed by the summit and attached to the Council (For how long? Would he 
also be attached to the Commission ?) It would be difficult to make the Presidency 
longer. With 15 you alcated. Also it has not worked well. With better procedures 
something rwght have been done in Yugoslavia. The procedures are certainly faulty -
however the real problem is the lack of political will . The system providng for QM for 
implementation has never been used. 
ready have to wait 7 1/2 years. 
(3) The Third Pillar. This has been the worst failure of Maastricht. It ahs not worked at 
all. The main reason it has not worked is that its procedures were directly copied from 
Pillar II. But PESC is quickly moving whereas Pillar III concerns issues of long duration . 
(The negotiation of conventions). 
,, We must-consider the efficiency ofMaastricht in view of the new Europe. Can we have 
· unanimity with 30 (6 PECOs + 3 Baltics +Malta + Cyprus + some ex-Yugoslavi an 
republics) . We may need to remove areas subject to unanimity such as tax from the 
Treaty . 
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- The question of multispeed options must be considered. So far, what has worked is 
where "balanced priorities" were agreed on, e.g. The UK wanted the liberalization of 
financial markets, Germany wanted common industrial standards. These had to be done 
together or not at all. 
There should be economic as well as the monetary union. If there is too much a la carte 
action you end up by dismantling the Union. All multispeed questions will ·be left to the 
end of the negotiations. 
- There will of course be parallel agendas to that of the IGC. 
(a) In 1998, WEU review (Treaty of Bruxelles) 
(b) In 1999, end of structural package (Delors II) 
(c) Also, PECO enlargement which is linked . . 
Sometime towards the end of the IGC the (b) & (c) agendas will coincide 
(d) EMU in 1999. IGC will not re-open the criteria. That is the general feeling. 
The Commission cannot go too far in its demands too quickly because it is not equipped 
(eg defence) but also because it does not want to offend member states. Most of the IGC 
reflection group are Secretaries of St~tes. The Reflection Group will not necessarily be 
a negotiating group but could end up like that as some options become clearer. 
On Pillar III, we have seen very loose cooperation on traditional areas but no real 
progress on issues such as the asylum convention. So either you communitarize this with, 
perhaps, a different legal tool (rather than relying on directives ). 
Another recommendation could be an extension of co-decision. The Commission feels 
that it has worked well and that it combines well with QM. · Michel Petite favours 
extending it to all QM votes . 
... 
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